Family tragedies test the boundaries of law and equity. A spouse dies under suspicious circumstances. An indictment for murder follows. Meanwhile, the accused stands to inherit substantial property as the surviving spouse or named beneficiary in the decedent’s will. The legal system must then grapple with a fundamental question of justice.
Texas statutes of descent and distribution speak clearly about who inherits when someone dies. These statutes make no explicit exception for heirs who cause the decedent’s death. If courts enforce statutes literally, a murderer could inherit from the victim and profit from the crime. Yet basic notions of justice recoil at this result. No one should benefit from their own wrongdoing.
The court addressed this exact dilemma in Pritchett v. Henry, 287 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1955). The case provides an opportunity to examine how Texas courts use constructive trusts to prevent unjust enrichment when statutory inheritance laws would otherwise allow killers to profit from their crimes.
Facts & Procedural History
Melba died on or about January 8, 1955, in Houston. Her husband Percy allegedly shot and killed her unlawfully. A Harris County grand jury indicted Percy for Melba’s murder. At the time of Melba’s death, she had executed a will that named Percy as beneficiary. The will was subsequently admitted to probate in Harris County Probate Court. Melba and Percy had no children.
Melba also owned several life insurance policies at her death. Percy was named as beneficiary on these policies. Under the Texas Insurance Code, beneficiaries who wrongfully cause the insured’s death forfeit their interests in policy proceeds. This statutory provision directly addressed the life insurance question.
Melba’s parents Howard and Clyda filed suit against Percy and the life insurance companies. They alleged they were Melba’s next of kin after Percy. Their petition sought multiple forms of relief. First, they requested forfeiture of Percy’s interests in the life insurance policies under Article 21.23 of the Texas Insurance Code. Second, they asked the court to declare Melba’s will inoperative as to any terms making Percy a beneficiary. Third, they requested that the court impress a constructive trust upon property passing by inheritance from Melba to Percy for the benefit of themselves as Melba’s other heirs. Fourth, they alleged a tort action for wrongful death.
Percy answered with a plea in abatement as part of the probate litigation. He argued that the first and third counts of the petition failed to allege causes of action upon which judgment could be awarded as a matter of law. These counts related to the will and inheritance issues rather than the life insurance proceeds. The trial court sustained Percy’s plea in abatement and dismissed these causes of action. The parties stipulated to sever the suit involving insurance proceeds from the other claims. The parents appealed only the trial court’s dismissal of their claims regarding the will and inherited property. They presented no argument on appeal concerning the wrongful death claim.
The appeal presented squarely for the first time in Texas reported cases whether a person who willfully and unlawfully kills another may take title to property as heir or legatee of the victim and retain it free of a constructive trust. Understanding how the Court of Appeals resolved this question requires examining Texas inheritance statutes, the concept of constructive trusts, and competing approaches to preventing killers from profiting.
Texas Inheritance Laws and the Silence of Statutes
Texas statutes governing wills and descent and distribution establish clear rules for property transfer at death. These statutes designate who inherits property when someone dies testate or intestate. The community property survivorship statute provides that upon dissolution of marriage by death, all community property goes to the surviving spouse when there are no children or descendants.
The language of these statutes is plain and unambiguous. They designate the persons to whom estates shall descend upon death. Notably, these statutes contain neither conditions nor exceptions debarring or forfeiting estates based on how the decedent died. The statutes make no mention of murder or wrongful killing. They simply specify that surviving spouses and heirs receive designated shares.
This statutory silence creates the central problem. If courts enforce inheritance statutes literally according to their plain terms, killers would inherit from victims. The statutes cast title to the murderer regardless of how the death occurred. Some courts have therefore concluded that judicial intervention to prevent such inheritance would improperly add exceptions to statutes that contain none.
This literalist approach appeared in the 1912 Texas case Hill v. Noland, 149 S.W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1912). That court held that Texas statutes provide that community property goes to the surviving spouse when there are no children. The court found the statutory language explicit and imperative. Because the statute contained no clause disinheriting a survivor for murdering the deceased spouse, the court concluded it could not read such an exception into the statute. The court reasoned that where inheritance law alone casts title to the survivor, that law is absolute and peremptory. The Texas Supreme Court denied writ of error.
However, Hill v. Noland did not represent the final word on this issue. Later Texas Supreme Court decisions suggested a different approach was developing.
The Supreme Court’s Movement Toward Constructive Trusts
The Texas Supreme Court signaled its receptiveness to imposing constructive trusts in murder cases through two significant decisions. In Greer v. Franklin Life Insurance Co., 221 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1949), Justice Garwood’s opinion specifically referenced Hill v. Noland. The Court noted that “in that case, incidentally, the more modern view of imposing a constructive trust upon property inherited by a murderer from his victim, for the benefit of the heirs other than the murderer, was evidently not suggested or considered.”
While Greer involved life insurance rather than inheritance, the Supreme Court’s characterization of constructive trusts as “the more modern view” indicated the Court’s inclination toward this approach. The opinion suggested that Hill v. Noland might have been decided differently had constructive trust principles been argued.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1947), proved even more significant. That case involved extraordinary facts that broadly presented whether law would impress a constructive trust when someone benefits from their own fraudulent or unlawful act. Carrie had prepared her will leaving all property to Claytonia, who was not related to her. The will was brought to Carrie and read to her in the presence of summoned witnesses. As Carrie prepared to sign the will, two of her heirs physically prevented her from executing it through force or by creating a disturbance. Carrie lapsed into a semi-comatose condition shortly thereafter and died three days later.
The Supreme Court held that a trust would be impressed upon Carrie’s property in favor of Claytonia. The trust would burden not only the interests inherited by those who participated in preventing the will’s execution but also the interests inherited by all of Carrie’s heirs. The Court characterized this as a typical case for equity’s intervention to prevent wrongdoers who acquire title through fraud or wrongful acts from retaining and enjoying beneficial interests. Equity impresses constructive trusts upon such property in favor of those truly and equitably entitled.
The Pope decision established that constructive trusts operate independently of statutory inheritance schemes. The Court emphasized that imposing constructive trusts does not contravene or circumvent statutes of descent and distribution, wills, or frauds. Constructive trusts are creatures of equity imposed irrespective of and even contrary to parties’ intentions. Courts resort to constructive trusts so that statutes enacted to prevent fraud are not used as instruments for perpetrating or protecting fraud.
What Are Constructive Trusts and How Do They Work?
Constructive trusts differ fundamentally from express trusts created by settlors’ intent. Express trusts arise when settlors manifest intent to create trust relationships and transfer property to trustees for beneficiaries’ benefit. The Texas Property Code governs express trust creation and requires written evidence for real property trusts.
Constructive trusts arise by operation of law regardless of parties’ intentions. Courts impose constructive trusts to prevent unjust enrichment when someone acquires property through wrongful conduct. The person holding legal title becomes a constructive trustee who must convey the property to those equitably entitled to it. Constructive trusts remedy situations where allowing legal title holders to retain property would violate fundamental fairness principles.
Professor James Barr Ames articulated the theoretical foundation for constructive trusts in murder cases in his 1897 monograph. He posed the question: “Can a murderer acquire title by his crime and keep it?” Professor Ames suggested three possible answers. First, the murderer takes property and keeps it. Second, the murderer does not take property at all. Third, the murderer takes property but holds it upon constructive trust.
Professor Ames advocated the third view. Legal title passes to the murderer under inheritance statutes. However, equity treats the murderer as a constructive trustee because of the unconscionable mode of title acquisition. Equity then compels the murderer to convey title to the deceased’s heirs exclusive of the murderer. This approach respects statutory inheritance schemes while preventing unjust enrichment.
The Restatement of Restitution and Scott on Trusts both adopted Professor Ames’s approach. These authorities explain that where statutes of wills and descent and distribution make no provision regarding murder’s effect, property initially passes under the will or by intestacy to the killer. The equitable principle against unjust enrichment then becomes applicable. That principle applies equally whether title is acquired through murder, fraud, duress, or undue influence.
By imposing constructive trusts, courts do not make exceptions to statutory provisions. Courts merely compel murderers to surrender profits of their crimes and prevent unjust enrichment. Courts need not violate inheritance statutes to deprive murderers of property. They simply apply the well-settled equitable principle under which constructive trusts are imposed upon those who acquire property through wrongdoing.
Application to Spousal Murder and Community Property
The constructive trust principle applies with equal force when spouses murder each other. Some argue that surviving spouses’ statutory rights should remain intact even after murdering their deceased spouses. At common law, widows held inchoate dower rights during coverture that could not be defeated by husbands’ wills or inter vivos conveyances without consent. If widows had these interests during husbands’ lifetimes, perhaps they should not be deprived of them even through murder.
However, this argument fails to account for the wrongful conduct that ensures survival. If the murdering spouse had predeceased the victim, the survivor would have taken no interest in the property. Through the felonious act, the killer made it certain they survived. The killer should therefore be precluded from enjoying property interests that depend on survival.
Texas community property law makes this analysis even clearer. Community property survivorship statutes provide that surviving spouses receive certain shares when the other spouse dies intestate. The same reasoning that supports imposing constructive trusts when heirs murder decedents applies when spouses murder each other. The surviving spouse should not be permitted to keep or enjoy community property because the willful act made certain the killer survived. The killer should be precluded from keeping and enjoying property taken as a community survivor.
This principle extends to both intestate succession and testamentary gifts. Whether the killer takes as heir under descent and distribution statutes or as beneficiary under the victim’s will makes no difference. In either case, legal title passes to the killer under applicable statutes or the will’s terms. Equity then impresses a constructive trust on that legal title for the benefit of the victim’s other heirs.
Why Constructive Trusts Do Not Violate Statutory Schemes
Courts rejecting constructive trusts in murder cases often argue that imposing such trusts improperly adds exceptions to inheritance statutes. This argument maintains that if the Legislature wanted to disinherit killers, it should have included such provisions in the statutes. Courts should not usurp the legislative function by judicially creating exceptions.
The Pope v. Garrett decision thoroughly addressed and rejected this argument. The Supreme Court explained that constructive trusts are not within inheritance statutes or represent exceptions to them. Constructive trusts are creatures of equity that arise irrespective of statutory schemes. They do not arise from parties’ agreements but are imposed contrary to parties’ intentions.
The distinction lies in understanding what constructive trusts accomplish. The inheritance statutes remain completely operative. Legal title passes exactly as the statutes provide. No exception to the statutes occurs. Equity simply acts upon the conscience of the legal title holder after title has passed. The constructive trustee must then convey legal title to those equitably entitled to it.
Consider the Pope case itself. Claytonia did not acquire title through the will. The trust did not owe its validity to the will. The statute of descent and distribution remained untouched. Legal title passed to Carrie’s heirs when she died intestate. Equity dealt with the legal title holders for their wrong in preventing the will’s execution and impressed a trust favoring the one in good conscience entitled to the property.
The same analysis applies in murder cases. The killer’s name appears on title documents. The killer could produce a will or inheritance statute showing their right to the property. However, equity looks beyond the legal title’s formal correctness to the unconscionable manner of its acquisition. Equity then requires the killer to hold the property for the victim’s other heirs.
This approach allows courts to honor statutory inheritance schemes while preventing the manifest injustice of allowing killers to profit from their crimes. The Legislature need not anticipate every possible wrongful scenario and write specific exceptions into statutes. Equity’s flexible principles address unjust enrichment across contexts.
The Beaumont Court’s Holding and Its Implications
The Court of Civil Appeals held that the parents’ petition alleged a valid cause of action. The petition alleged wrongful and unlawful killing of Melba by Percy. It alleged Percy was a beneficiary in her will and would inherit as next of kin since they had no children. It alleged the parents were Melba’s next of kin. It properly prayed for imposition of a constructive trust in the parents’ favor.
The court held that if Percy wrongfully and unlawfully killed Melba as alleged, then legal title to her property passed to him either by inheritance or as beneficiary under her will. However, the law would impose a constructive trust upon such property in favor of the heirs other than Percy. This holding required no exception to inheritance statutes. Legal title passed under the statutes. Equity simply prevented Percy from retaining the beneficial interest.
The court reversed the trial court’s judgment sustaining the plea in abatement. The court rendered judgment overruling the plea in abatement as to the first count of the petition. The cause was remanded for trial on the merits. At that trial, the parents would need to prove that Percy wrongfully and unlawfully killed Melba. If they satisfied that burden, the constructive trust would be impressed upon the inherited property.
The court’s decision aligned Texas law with the modern view adopted in most American jurisdictions. Courts across the country had increasingly recognized that allowing killers to inherit from victims violated fundamental principles of justice. The constructive trust mechanism provided the means to prevent such unjust enrichment without disturbing statutory inheritance schemes.
The Takeaway
The Pritchett decision establishes that Texas law prevents killers from profiting through inheritance from their victims even when statutes of descent and distribution contain no explicit exception for murder. Legal title passes to killers under applicable statutes or will provisions. However, equity impresses constructive trusts upon that legal title for the benefit of the victim’s other heirs. This approach honors statutory inheritance schemes while preventing the manifest injustice of allowing wrongdoers to benefit from their crimes.
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